Downloads http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/ Mon, 23 Nov 2009 19:03:36 -0700 FeedCreator 1.7.2 en Shared Intention, Reliance, and Interpersonal Obligations. Ethics 119 (2009): 444–475. http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132801/ Thu, 19 Nov 2009 00:05:26 -0700 132801 The Other Problem of Negative Existentials http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132519/ New draft

]]> Sat, 14 Nov 2009 08:00:00 -0700 132519 Deflationary Reference and Negative Existentials http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132786/ Thu, 29 Oct 2009 23:42:29 -0700 132786 Metaphysics as Make-Believe http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132731/ Thu, 01 Oct 2009 21:39:29 -0700 132731 Dynamic Testimonial Logic http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132706/ Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Logic, Rationality and Interaction (LORI-II), Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 5834, pp. 161-179.

]]> Mon, 21 Sep 2009 07:00:00 -0700 132706 A topological study of the closed fragment of GLP http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132541/ Forthcoming in Journal of Logic and Computation (OUP).

]]> Wed, 12 Aug 2009 07:00:00 -0700 132541 On topological models of GLP http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132536/ (with Lev Beklemishev and Guram Bezhanishvili)

]]> Fri, 31 Jul 2009 07:00:00 -0700 132536 Intention Rationality http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132481/ Author Posting. (c) Taylor & Francis, 2009.    This is the author's version of the work.  It is posted here by permission of Taylor & Francis for personal use, not for redistribution.    The definitive version was published in Philosophical Explorations, Volume 12 Issue 3, September 2009.

doi:10.1080/13869790903067717 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869790903067717)

]]> Mon, 13 Jul 2009 07:00:00 -0700 132481 Setiya on Intention, Rationality and Reasons http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132406/ Analysis 69 (2009): 510-521.


 

]]> Tue, 30 Jun 2009 07:00:00 -0700 132406 Deductive Constraints and Binary Beliefs http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132509/ Fri, 12 Jun 2009 04:15:34 -0700 132509 Intention, Practical Rationality, and Self-Governance http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132471/  Ethics 119 (April 2009):411-443.





 

]]> Mon, 08 Jun 2009 07:00:00 -0700 132471 A Holistic Hypothesis for Language Acquisition: A Philosophical Perspective, Foreign Language ... http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132497/ Thu, 21 May 2009 16:59:57 -0700 132497 Unsayability and Phenomenal Meaning, Foreign Language Research (3): 20-25, 2006 http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132496/ Thu, 21 May 2009 16:58:19 -0700 132496 The Holistic Hypothesis and L2 Teaching, Modern Foreign Languages (1): 73-78, 2007 http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132495/ Thu, 21 May 2009 16:57:00 -0700 132495 The Aroma of Coffee: Exploring the Unsayability of Sensory Experience, 2007 http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132494/ Thu, 21 May 2009 16:55:14 -0700 132494 A Tripartite Taxonomy of ES Meanings and the Limits of Translation, Journal of Jinan University ... http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132493/ Thu, 21 May 2009 16:50:51 -0700 132493 A Map Theory of Language, Foreign Language Research (3): 7-12, 2008 http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132492/ Thu, 21 May 2009 16:48:07 -0700 132492 Modest Sociality and the Distinctiveness of Intention http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132263/ Philosophical Studies  (2009)  144: 149-65.

Please quote from published verison.

]]> Mon, 27 Apr 2009 07:00:00 -0700 132263 Intention, Belief, and Wishful Thinking:  Setiya on "Practical Knowledge" http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132476/ Sun, 26 Apr 2009 01:53:55 -0700 132476 Eternal Recurrence and Nihilism: Adding Weight to the Unbearable Lightness of Action http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132454/ Version 2.3

]]> Tue, 07 Apr 2009 20:02:53 -0700 132454 "Ensemble Dynamics of Intermittency and Power-Law Decay" (with Dean J. ... http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132451/ Thu, 02 Apr 2009 06:19:49 -0700 132451 "On background: Using two-argument chance."  Synthese 116:165-186 (2009). http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132434/ Wed, 01 Apr 2009 20:21:16 -0700 132434 "How and how not to make predictions with temporal Copernicanism. ... http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132433/ Wed, 01 Apr 2009 20:20:07 -0700 132433 Intention, Belief, and Instrumental Rationality http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132267/ In David Sobel and Steven Wall, eds., Reasons for Action  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009): 13-36.


http://www.cambridge.org/us/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521877466


This pdf file is an almost final version.  Please quote only from published version.

]]> Wed, 01 Apr 2009 07:00:00 -0700 132267 Reviews March 2009 http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132426/ Reviews to be published in Mathematical Reviews and Zentralblatt fuer Mathematik

]]> Fri, 27 Mar 2009 07:00:00 -0700 132426 Description of 137/237 Wittgenstein, Spring 2008-9 http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132419/ Wed, 25 Mar 2009 07:00:00 -0700 132419 Cut Free Formulations for a Quantified Logic of Here and There http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132399/ Submitted to Shanin Festschrift volume of Annals of Pure and Applied Logic

]]> Fri, 20 Mar 2009 07:00:00 -0700 132399 Analytic Cut in Modal Logic: the System B http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132400/ Draft; To be submitted

]]> Fri, 20 Mar 2009 07:00:00 -0700 132400 "Hilbert, Pre-Established Harmony, and the 'Finite Stance'" http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132432/ talk at conference "Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics", Jerusalem, 19 March 2009

]]> Thu, 19 Mar 2009 07:00:00 -0700 132432 Who Does What http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/131745/ This document tells you who does what in the department in terms of staff.  If you're not sure who to contact about something, please refer to this list for the correct person.

]]> Mon, 16 Mar 2009 07:00:00 -0700 131745 Individual User Manual for Website http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132338/ Version 1.9

]]> Thu, 12 Mar 2009 07:00:00 -0700 132338 The Nature of Inclination http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132378/ There is a puzzle in the very notion of passive motivation ("passion" or "inclination"). To be motivated is not simply to be moved from the outside. Motivation is in some sense self-movement. But how can an agent be passive with respect to her own motivation? How is passive motivation possible? In this paper I defend the ancient view that inclination stems from a motivational source independent of reason, a motivational source that is both agential and nonrational.

]]> Thu, 12 Mar 2009 07:00:00 -0700 132378 Fichte's Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132353/ A new Introduction to the Cambridge reissue of the Garrett Green translation of J. G. Fichte's first published work. It provides historical background, exposition of the work and a discussion of Fichte's influence on nineteenth and twentieth century continental philosophy.

]]> Wed, 11 Mar 2009 21:42:04 -0700 132353 Exploitation http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132352/ This paper attempts to clarify the concept of exploitation and to say what we think is bad about exploitation. It features discussions of recent literature on the topic, the Marxist thesis that capital exploits labor and the charge that surrogacy contracts exploit the birth mother.

]]> Wed, 11 Mar 2009 21:35:15 -0700 132352 Measuring Information in Nature http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132341/ Dretske (1981) attempts to ground epistemology in an account of the flow of information in nature. Skyrms (forthcoming) argues that Dretske’s account offers the wrong notion of informational content. Dretske argues that a signal carries information about some state of affairs if and only if that state of affairs obtains with probability 1. This strict requirement allows Dretske to ground knowledge in information, but prevents him from taking advantage of the flexibility inherent in a probabilistic account. In contrast, Skyrms develops a theory of content in signaling games that derives directly from divergence measures in information theory. This theory is flexible, but is defined for communication signals, not natural events. What happens if we treat nature as a participant in a signaling game: can we provide an account of the informational content of natural events? This paper offers such an account. Section 1 motivates the task. Section 2 defines a model of natural events and demonstrates how a probability distribution can be defined over it. In Section 3, Skyrms’ strategy for characterizing informational content is applied to this model. I conclude with some comparisons to other approaches and conjectures about future directions.

]]> Wed, 11 Mar 2009 17:41:55 -0700 132341 Hegel on Responsibility for Actions and Consequences http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132337/ Hegel develops a theory of the imputability of deeds and consequences that contrasts favorably with Kant's and deals interestingly with some issues usually considered under the heading of "moral luck."

]]> Wed, 11 Mar 2009 14:39:24 -0700 132337 Herder and Kant on History: Their Enlightenment Faith http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132336/ J. G. Herder is commonly understood as a critic of Kant, and the Enlightenment. This paper defends a different reading, and also the thesis that the Enlightenment embodies a faith in human progress that is not only consistent with historical evidence but sometimes required to evaluate the evidence rationally.

]]> Wed, 11 Mar 2009 14:06:24 -0700 132336 How to Reconcile Deflationism and Nonfactualism http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132328/ Wed, 11 Mar 2009 02:54:52 -0700 132328 Kant and the Intelligibility of Evil http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132321/ Kant's thesis that human nature has a radical propensity to evil has been criticized as not allowing for actions that are extremely evil, and also on the ground that Kant does not make human evil intelligible to us. This paper replies to both criticisms, and argues that Kant locates both evil and the struggle against it in human social life.

]]> Tue, 10 Mar 2009 23:51:45 -0700 132321 Links to C.V. and to online papers http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132309/ Tue, 10 Mar 2009 20:31:18 -0700 132309 Kant and the Right to Lie http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132320/ Kant's essay  "On a Presumed Right to Lie from Philanthropy" (1797), is widely held to advocate an unreasonably extreme position about the prohibition on lying. I argue that his position is not what it is commonly taken to be, and that it is quite reasonable.

]]> Tue, 10 Mar 2009 07:00:00 -0700 132320 Who They Are and What De Se: Burge on Quasi-Memory http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132323/ Philosophical Studies (May 2009). I defend Sydney Shoemaker's quasi-memory-based approach to diachronic personal identity against a recent criticism by Tyler Burge.

]]> Tue, 10 Mar 2009 07:00:00 -0700 132323 How We Know What We're Doing http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132291/ Tue, 10 Mar 2009 01:25:03 -0700 132291  Equality, Adequacy and Education for Citizenship, Ethics 117 [July 2007] http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132290/ Tue, 10 Mar 2009 01:17:25 -0700 132290 Carnap's 1934 Objections to Wittgenstein's Say/Show Distinction http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132298/ A defense of Carnap's interpretation of and objections to Wittgenstein's say/show distinction (currently under review).

]]> Mon, 09 Mar 2009 07:00:00 -0700 132298 Reinterpreting the Kwakiutl Hamatsa Dance As an Expression of the Apollonian and Dionysian ... http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132245/ In Patterns of Culture, Ruth Benedict appropriates Nietzsche’s distinction between the Apollonian and Dionysian art impulses as the model for her discussion of cultural diversity among North American Indians. However, Benedict’s use of the Nietzschean model not only fails to capture the true ritual significance of the religious or spiritual practices of Kwakiutl Indians of the North West Coast, the result of which portrays the Kwakiutl as primitive savages, but it is also a crude misrepresentation of the Nietzschean model she takes herself to be adopting. While I do not think that Benedict’s position is definitive of current scholarship on this topic, it is my contention that the Apollonian/Dionysian model, properly understood, yields some rather interesting insights into the religio-spiritual practices of the Kwakiutl and so is deserving of further study. This article offers an interpretation of the hamatsa dance of the Kwakiutl Winter Ceremonial as a synthesis of both Apollonian and Dionysian art impulses through which the Kwakiutl construct their ontological and moral worldview.

]]> Fri, 06 Mar 2009 20:51:05 -0700 132245  Moore's Paradox  http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132218/  An utterance semantic account of Moorean absurdity.


Co-authored with John Perry

]]> Wed, 04 Mar 2009 22:23:37 -0700 132218 The Persistent Mystery of Existence http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132751/ Sun, 01 Mar 2009 08:00:00 -0700 132751 Dogmatism Repuzzled http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132257/ Philosophical Studies (forthcoming) (with Levi Spectre)


Harman and Lewis credit Kripke with having formulated a puzzle that seems to show that knowledge entails dogmatism. The puzzle is widely regarded as having been solved. In this paper we argue that this standard solution, in its various versions, addresses only a limited aspect of the puzzle and holds no promise of fully resolving it. Analyzing this failure and the proper rendering of the puzzle, it is suggested that it poses a significant challenge for the defense of epistemic closure.

]]> Fri, 09 Jan 2009 08:00:00 -0700 132257 Action and Belief: Dutch Book Arguments for Generalized Sleeping Beauty http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132339/ In section 1, I respond to the challenge which concludes Horgan, et al. (2008) by providing a sub jectivist analysis of a generalized form of the Sleeping Beauty problem. The argument consists in offering a Dutch Book in the style of Hitchcock (2004). Although this analysis will appear at first to support the “thirdist” conclusion, I will argue in section 2 for a closer examination of the relationship between actions and beliefs. In particular, I will suggest that a Hitchcock-style Dutch Book (and, by extension, any “thirdist” analysis of Sleeping Beauty) can only motivate the correct behavior for a limited class of actions. By varying the mechanism by which bets are stored, we can explore the relationship between actions and repetition via simultaneous parallel Dutch Book arguments. The moral of this exercise is “halfist” in flavor. Specifically, I argue that only if Beauty does not change her degree of belief once the experiment has commenced can she calculate appropriate behavior during the experiment for the full range of possible actions. Although the perspective is resolutely sub jectivist throughout, I conclude with a challenge to objectivist “thirdists”: how can an “objective” probability assignment be taken seriously if it cannot be used as a basis for rational action?


[a revised version of this paper is currently under submission to Synthese]


 

]]> Tue, 07 Oct 2008 07:00:00 -0700 132339 Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132262/ Forthcoming in Simon Robertson, ed.,   Spheres of Reason: New Essays on the Philosophy of Normativity   (Oxford University Press) 


http://www.oup.com/uk/catalogue/?ci=9780199572939

]]> Mon, 22 Sep 2008 07:00:00 -0700 132262 Shared Agency http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132280/ Forthcoming in in C. Mantzavinos, ed., Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice  Cambridge University Press, 2009)

]]> Mon, 30 Jun 2008 07:00:00 -0700 132280 Prospects for Naturalizing Color, or "What's blue and yellow and green all over?" http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/131770/ In Churchland (2007), Paul Churchland gives an argument for the "objective reality" of color; the strategy he deploys to make this argument is an instance of a more general research program, which he calls "domain-portrayal semantics." In section 1, I point out some features of color vision which complicate Churchland's conclusion, in particular, the context sensitive and inferential nature of color perception. In section 2, I examine and defend the general research program, concluding that it lies at the intersection of strategies to naturalize representational content. Such a minimally naturalistic, or operationalist, program involves two components: first, a mapping between the target domain of represented structures (colors, shapes, middle-sized dry goods, whatever) and the target range of representational cognitive structures; second, a detailed account of the causal processes which induce this mapping. I conclude with some conjectures concerning the future of such an operationalist program, in particular, that other perceptual domains may exhibit the same context sensitivity and inferential character as color.


[forthcoming in slightly revised form in the special issue of the PSA journal on contributed papers from PSA 2008]

]]> Tue, 24 Jun 2008 17:51:44 -0700 131770 Response to Gut Reactions http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132303/ Longer version of my PPR Symposium Piece on Jesse J. Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotions, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3), May 2008, 720-8.

]]> Thu, 08 May 2008 07:00:00 -0700 132303 Office Hours Spring 2008 http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/131623/ Mon, 10 Mar 2008 07:00:00 -0700 131623 Reflections on the Philosophy of Action http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132264/ In Jesus Aguilar and Andrei A. Buckareff, eds.  Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions  (Automatic Press/VIP, 2009)

]]> Wed, 30 Jan 2008 08:00:00 -0700 132264 Is Virtue Sufficient For Happiness? the contemporary relevance of an ancient question http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132310/ This essay (my MA Thesis) explores the relation between virtue and happiness, and is primarily an exercise at the intersection of ancient and contemporary ethics, with emphasis on the contemporary end of the spectrum.

    Specifically, I argue that the thesis that virtue is sufficient for happiness (the Sufficiency Thesis) needs to be reconsidered in contemporary ethical debates, as it has been mostly ignored since its unequivocal abandonment well over a thousand years ago. This conclusion might come as a surprise given that today many argue that virtue is not even necessary for happiness (the Necessity Thesis), let alone sufficient for it. I will spend some time discussing the plausibility of virtue’s necessity relation to happiness.

    Despite the unilateral rejection of the Sufficiency Thesis, I will argue that the reasons traditionally given for rejecting it are seriously flawed. In this process, I will show that any conclusions drawn are crucially linked to one’s theory of virtuous activity and the necessary conditions under which such action may be called successful. This will show that we must be careful to separate ancient formulations of the thesis from contemporary and plausible formulations of it.

    Seeing that the reasons given for rejecting the Sufficiency Thesis are flawed will only get us to the conclusion that the Sufficiency Thesis needs to be reconsidered; and indeed, this is an important conclusion. I go further, however, and give some reason to think that, given the choice between the Necessity Thesis and the Sufficiency Thesis, the Sufficiency Thesis is actually the more plausible of the two. This is surprising indeed considering the historical dominance of the Necessity Thesis view.

    In the end, my conclusions herein are meant as a sort of grounding for further work in debates about the relation between virtue and happiness, and debates about theories of happiness and well-being more generally.

]]> Sun, 13 Jan 2008 08:00:00 -0700 132310 Honest Illusion: Valuing for Nietzsche's Free Spirits http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132089/ In Nietzsche and Morality, edited by Brian Leiter and Neil Sinhababu, 157-91. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Chosen for the Philosopher's Annual 2008 as one of the ten best philosophy articles published in 2007.


In his blog posting, "Is Nietzsche a Fictionalist?", Brian Leiter provides a detailed critique of this paper.

]]> Mon, 31 Dec 2007 08:00:00 -0700 132089 Requirements of Rationality http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132455/ Version 2.4

]]> Sun, 12 Aug 2007 07:00:00 -0700 132455 Mr. Magoo's Mistake http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132251/ Philosophical Studies, 139, 289-306 (2008) (with Levi Spectre)


Timothy Williamson has famously argued that the KK principle

(namely, that if one knows that p, then one knows that one knows that p) should be rejected. We analyze Williamson’s argument and show that its key premise is ambiguous, and that when it is properly stated this premise no longer supports the argument against (KK). After canvassing possible objections to our argument, we reflect upon some conclusions that suggest significant epistemological ramifications pertaining to the  acquisition of knowledge from prior knowledge by deduction.

]]> Thu, 09 Aug 2007 07:00:00 -0700 132251 Metaethics and Nihilism in Reginster's The Affirmation of Life http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132090/ Version 1.8 (July 21, 2007).


It is not a simple matter to determine either what Nietzsche means by ‘nihilism’ or what he thinks we should do about it. To start with, there seem to be many different nihilisms discussed in different places in Nietzsche’s writings.  Furthermore, though he seems at times to accept positions we might be inclined to think of as nihilistic, he also presents himself as showing us, or at least some of us, a path beyond nihilism.


]]> Sat, 21 Jul 2007 07:00:00 -0700 132090 Structures of Agency:  Essays http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132283/ Oxford University Press, 2007.


 For review see


http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=9623 

]]> Thu, 01 Feb 2007 08:00:00 -0700 132283 Problems of Paraphrase: Bottom's Dream http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132278/ Philosophers and critics alike often contend that metaphors cannot or should not be paraphrased, ever. Yet a simple and decisive empirical argument — The Horse’s Mouth Argument — suffices to show that many metaphors can be paraphrased without violating the spirit in which they were put forward in the first place. This argument leaves us with urgent unanswered questions about the role of paraphrase in a more inclusive division of exegetical labor, about the tension between its notorious openendedness and its claim to restate something already stated, and about the relation between the content of a paraphrase and the content (or contents) of the metaphor the paraphrase purports to explain. But it leaves us in a position to state such questions more clearly and hopefully than we could before.

]]> Mon, 01 Jan 2007 08:00:00 -0700 132278 Identifying Fact and Fiction http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132791/ Fri, 22 Dec 2006 08:00:00 -0700 132791 Anchors for Deliberation http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132566/ A slightly revised version of this manuscript appears in Christoph Lumer and Sandro Nannini, eds., Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy  (Ashgate, 2007): 187-205.  Please quote from published verison. 

]]> Mon, 16 Oct 2006 07:00:00 -0700 132566 Kantian Rigorism and Mitigating Conditions http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132379/ There is a tension between the deontological intuition that actions of certain types (e.g., deception) are wrong "in themselves," independently of the particular circumstances, and the intuition that such actions can be permissible under certain extreme or unusual circumstances. I argue that we can save both intuitions if we conceive of moral rules on the model of ideal practice rules.

]]> Sun, 15 Oct 2006 07:00:00 -0700 132379 Misunderstanding Metaethics: Korsgaard's Rejection of Realism http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132591/ In Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, 265-294. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006.



  • Co-authored with Nishi Shah, Department of Philosophy, Amherst College

  • Also available at Amazon.

]]> Fri, 01 Sep 2006 07:00:00 -0700 132591 Friedrich Albert Lange http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132596/ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.)

]]> Sat, 31 Dec 2005 19:32:02 -0700 132596 Review of John Skorupski, Ethical Explorations http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132606/ Ethics 115, no. 3 (2005): 626-28

]]> Thu, 01 Sep 2005 07:00:00 -0700 132606 The Return of Moral Fictionalism http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132611/ Philosophical Perspectives 18, no. 1 (2004): 149-87

]]> Fri, 31 Dec 2004 08:00:00 -0700 132611 The Guise of a Reason http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132616/ Philosophical Studies 121, no. 3 (2004): 263-75.



]]> Fri, 31 Dec 2004 08:00:00 -0700 132616 Nietzsche's Positivism http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132621/ European Journal of Philosophy 12, no. 3 (2004): 326-68


For a critique of this article, see Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick, "Nietzsche's Post-Positivism," European Journal of Philosophy 12, no. 3 (2004): 369-85.

]]> Fri, 31 Dec 2004 08:00:00 -0700 132621 Reading Nietzsche through Ernst Mach http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132626/ Nietzsche and Science, edited by Gregory Moore and Thomas H. Brobjer, 111-29. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004.

]]> Fri, 31 Dec 2004 08:00:00 -0700 132626 Essays on the History of the Philosophy of Mathematics (ed.). http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132300/ Special issue of the Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal vol. 25, no. 2 (2004). Editor and Introduction.


A collection of essays by up and coming young scholars revisiting themes in the philosophy of mathematics from an historical perspective. Includes articles on Plato, Descartes, Vieta, Newton, Kant, and Gödel, among others.

]]> Mon, 15 Nov 2004 08:00:00 -0700 132300 Review of Rob Van Gerwen, ed., Richard Wollheim on the Art of Painting: Art as Representation ... http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132284/ An expanded version of the review I did for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

]]> Thu, 07 Oct 2004 07:00:00 -0700 132284 Review of Michael S. Green, Nietzsche and the Transcendental Tradition http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132601/ The Philosophical Review 113, no. 2 (2004): 275-78

]]> Wed, 01 Sep 2004 07:00:00 -0700 132601 The Last Collapse? An Essay Review of Hilary Putnam's The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy ... http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132301/ Philosophy of Science, vol. 71 (2004), pp. 402-11.


A lengthy review of Putnam's book.

]]> Thu, 15 Jul 2004 07:00:00 -0700 132301 Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132282/ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  1999)

]]> Wed, 10 Mar 1999 00:11:23 -0700 132282 Aptness and Truth in Verbal Metaphor http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132279/ Corrected version of the paper in Philosophical Topics 25 (1), Spring 1997, 117-53.

]]> Sun, 02 Mar 1997 00:01:46 -0700 132279 Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason http://philosophy.stanford.edu/community/documents-papers/view/132281/ (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1987).  Paperback edition:  1990.  Japanese translation (Tokyo:  Sangyo Tosho, 1994).   Reissued by CSLI  Publications, 1999

]]> Tue, 10 Mar 1987 00:09:51 -0700 132281