Krista Lawlor's Overview
Name:Krista LawlorTitle:Associate ProfessorDepartment:PhilosophyAdditional Appointments:affiliated faculty in Symbolic SystemsStanford Philosophy Department Member:YesAreas of Specialization:Philosophy of Mind, EpistemologyEmail Address:firstname.lastname@example.org
ContactView All Contact InformationPrimary Phone:650-723-3486Office Number (physical):building 90 room 92MOffice Hours:Wednesday 1:30-3pm and by appointmentStatus/NewsResearch Interests
In philosophy of mind, I work on issues about coreference and confusion. In epistemology, I work on a variety of issues including the nature of assurance, the semantics of knowledge ascription, self-knowledge, memory and inference.
Selected publications, organized thematically:
Assurance, and a draft of the precis of the book
and replies to critics.
Enough is enough: pretense and invariance in the semantics of ‘knows that’
Living without Closure
Liberalism without Dogmatism: Austin on Perceptual Knowledge (forthcoming)
Exploring the Stability of Belief: Resiliency and Temptation
Moore’s Paradox (with John Perry)
Memory, anaphora and content preservation
New Thoughts about Old Things: Cognitive Policies as the Ground of Singular Concepts
Files, Indexicals and Descriptivism
Reason and the past: the role of rationality in diachronic self-knowledge
Self-knowledge of belief
Knowing what one wants
Confusion (confused reference)
Confused thought and modes of presentation
A Notional worlds approach to confusion
Varieties of coreference
Additional Information/ Links
Coreference & Confusion
In my thesis (reviewed here), I worried about how confused one could be and still make a credible inference. Here's a newer account, and some thoughts about alternative approaches (first, on Kit Fine's Semantic Relationism, and second, on Ruth Millikan's anti-Fregeanism).
|Krista Lawlor||Varieties of Coreference
symposium on Kit Fine's Semantic Relationism
|Krista Lawlor|| Moore's Paradox
An utterance semantic account of Moorean absurdity.
Co-authored with John Perry