Tamar Schapiro's Overview
Name:Tamar SchapiroTitle:Associate ProfessorDepartment:PhilosophyStanford Philosophy Department Member:YesInstitution:StanfordAreas of Specialization:Ethics; History of Ethics; Kant's Practical Philosophy; Practical Reasoning; Moral Psychology; Philosophy of ActionEmail Address:firstname.lastname@example.org
ContactView All Contact InformationPrimary Phone:650-906-4496Office Number (physical):100-102AResearch Interests
The nature of passion/inclination and its role in practical reasoning; the structure of agency; the role of ideal concepts in moral theory; Kantian nonideal theoryShort Bio
B.A., Philosophy, Yale; Ph.D., Philosophy, Harvard; Harvard Society of Fellows
|Tamar Schapiro||On the Relation Between Wanting and Willing
In this paper I argue that there is a detailed analogy to be drawn between two relations of natural hierarchy: the relation between adults and children and the relation between our willing selves and our wanting selves. Attention to this analogy can help us to see the basis of the will's authority over inclination.
Foregrounding Desire: A Defense of Kant's Incorporation Thesis
|Tamar Schapiro||The Nature of Inclination
There is a puzzle in the very notion of passive motivation ("passion" or "inclination"). To be motivated is not simply to be moved from the outside. Motivation is in some sense self-movement. But how can an agent be passive with respect to her own motivation? How is passive motivation possible? In this paper I defend the ancient view that inclination stems from a motivational source independent of reason, a motivational source that is both agential and nonrational.
|Tamar Schapiro||Kantian Rigorism and Mitigating Conditions
There is a tension between the deontological intuition that actions of certain types (e.g., deception) are wrong "in themselves," independently of the particular circumstances, and the intuition that such actions can be permissible under certain extreme or unusual circumstances. I argue that we can save both intuitions if we conceive of moral rules on the model of ideal practice rules.
Compliance, Complicity, and the Nature of Nonideal Conditions
Childhood and Personhood
Three Conceptions of Action in Moral Theory
What is a Child?