Richard Kraut / Tanner Lecture Two - Virtue and Experience

Richard Kraut / Tanner Lecture Two - Virtue and Experience
Date
Thu April 20th 2017, 5:30 - 7:00pm
Event Sponsor
McCoy Family Center for Ethics in Society, Office of the President, Department of Philosophy
Location
Encina Hall, Bechtel Conference Center

 

 

The Tanner Lectures consist of two lectures, each followed by a distinct discussion seminar.
This year's Tanner Lectures are given by Richard Kraut, Charles and Emma Morrison Professor in the Humanities at Northwestern University. 
Series Abstract: To show that virtue is a component of well-being, Plato and Aristotle looked to the inner life of a good human being. Kraut argues that this is only correct path to this conclusion, committing him to what might be called “experientialism,” and so he offers a defense of that doctrine, as well as a series of observations regarding the inner life of a good person. This leads to a discussion of Nozick’s experience machine, often regarded as a refutation of experientialism. Another thought experiment plays a role in his argument: McTaggart’s claim that the life of an oyster (containing nothing but the mildest and simplest kind of pleasure) would be better than any human life, however rich – provided the oyster’s life was sufficiently longer than the human life.
Lecture Two: Virtue and Experience Thursday, April 20  5:30-7pm
In this lecture I propose an answer to the question, “What is the good in being a good human being?”  My answer adverts to the inner life of such a person. I do not claim (as Plato and Aristotle did) that evil people suffer for their evil. I consider Kant’s view that arguments from self-interest are irrelevant or worse. The rest of the lecture turns to a detailed examination of Nozick’s thought experiment. There is a problem of interpretation, because he under-specifies what is available to someone inside the machine.  But the main point is that there are good and bad uses of the machine; if it is used well, the thesis that it diminishes well-being is significantly weakened. I then examine some other familiar objections to experientialism (as a thesis about well-being): the disvalue of false friends and the possibility of posthumous goods and harms. Finally, I address the problem of social isolation raised by the experience machine: I do not want to be the only mind there is.
Discussion Two Friday, April 21  10am-12pmCommentators are:Stephen Darwall, Yale Philosophy Rebecca Newberger Goldstein, AuthorLecture One: The Richness of Human Experience Wednesday, April 19  5:30-7pm
Discussion One Thursday, April 20  10am-12pmCommentators are:Rachel Barney, University of Toronto, Classics and Philosophy Tom Hurka, University of Toronto, Philosophy
Read all participant bios here.

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