Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Perception
In this paper I explore the relationship between metaphysical theories of perception (e.g. naïve realism, representationalism) and psychological theories of perception (e.g. ecological theories, constructivism). Naturalist philosophers often draw conclusions about the metaphysics of perception based on psychological claims about the mechanisms of perception. I argue that few forms of naturalism would allow us to 'read off' the metaphysical theories straightforwardly from the scientific theories, and I demonstrate that naturalist philosophers can draw very different metaphysical conclusions from the same psychological theory of perception: there are clearly assumptions and reasoning processes involved that are not being made transparent. Whether these are scientific reasoning processes concerning the virtues of theories, for example, or assumptions about the relation between natural kinds and nomological necessity, a clearer statement of the reasoning involved would benefit both naturalist approaches to perception and their opponents. I conclude by exploring whether this is a problem for theories of perception in particular, or whether it applies to naturalism more generally.